Karl Popper (1902–1994) was one of the 20th century's most influential philosophers of science, best known for developing falsificationism—a revolutionary criterion for demarcating science from non-science.
Popper argued that scientific theories can never be conclusively verified through observation, since no finite number of confirming instances can prove a universal generalization. Instead, he proposed that a theory is scientific only if it is falsifiable—capable of being proven wrong by conceivable observations. Science progresses through bold conjectures that survive rigorous testing, not through accumulation of confirming evidence.
Falsifiability became Popper's solution to the "demarcation problem": distinguishing science from pseudoscience, metaphysics, and dogma. A theory that explains everything (e.g., by reinterpretation of counterevidence) explains nothing scientifically.
Popper famously classified Marxism and psychoanalysis as non-scientific because their proponents treated them as unfalsifiable—any outcome could be interpreted as confirmation. He viewed this immunization against refutation as the hallmark of pseudoscience.
Popper extended his fallibilist epistemology to politics: since no one possesses absolute truth, institutions must allow peaceful error correction. His open society concept champions piecemeal engineering over utopian blueprints, free criticism, and protection of minorities.
While later philosophers (Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend) challenged aspects of falsificationism, Popper's insistence on testability, criticism, and the provisional nature of knowledge remains foundational to scientific methodology and liberal political thought.